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This paper explores the problem of General Intellect, which is analysed in the post-Op-
eraismo intellectual movement. Reflecting the  thinking of A.  Negri, M.  Lazzarato, 
P. Virno, M. Pasquinelli and others, General Intellect is given here as a  synonym of 
society’s cognitive capacity that could either provide liberation from capitalism or be 
exploited by it. In this paper General Intellect is represented as a property of a social 
connection structure, called heterarchy. As a connection structure, heterarchy forms 
different kinds of singularities – finite objects composed of multiple social ties. These 
aggregations are made by statistical repetitions of relations and individual agents that 
make values through their goal setting and other intellectual activity. The main argu-
ment of the article is that although General Intellect may denote capacity for society’s 
self-organization, it is difficult to identify it with only one particular institutional or-
ganisation or political regime. General Intellect appears in any type of social structur-
ing through self-organising processes.
Keywords: general intellect, heterarchy, multitude, society, self-organisation, agent, ag-
gregate
INTRODUCTION
The initial metaphor of General Intellect was invented by K. Marx in his ‘Fragment on Ma-
chines’. It represents a  comparison of labour’s machinic organisation to the  knowledge of 
a human mind materially produced by brain. Later it was popularized by Italian (post)Op-
eraismo representatives. Literary, General Intellect is made of social relations with the inten-
tional knowledge and appears as a connection structure and value. General Intellect’s creative 
productivity should overcome the limitations imposed by capital and grant the society its po-
litical and economic freedoms (Lazzarato, Negri 1991; Virno 2004). However, there is another 
point of view, which assumes that the General Intellect as a social and communicative ability, 
or a kind of ‘social brain’, with the help of IT-technologies is appropriated by the new ‘society 
of control’. Contemporary development of media and Internet makes human relations more 
available for observation and control, which improves their appropriation and exploitation 
(Pasquinelli 2013: 1–20; Vercellone 2007: 13–36). Continuous scanning of people’s commu-
nication enables capital to mediate its dissemination and transformation from information 
into knowledge, with an ability to manipulate the ‘economy of attention’ for the purposes of 
‘cognitive capitalism’ (Pasquinelli 2009; Terranova 2012).
In this paper, the notion of General Intellect is compared with the  ‘heterarchy’ con-
cept that originated in early theories of artificial neural networks that define the connection 
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structure and the value formation principle. The concept of heterarchy, in spite of its heuris-
tic value, is not clearly defined yet. The main commentary was provided by W. S. McCulloch 
(McCulloch 1945), an author of the first theoretical artificial neural network model, in his 
research of brain neurones. McCulloch associated the heterarchy of values with the concept 
of the whole. Different parts of such an entity tie together each single entity and contribute 
to its changes. That makes the logical law of transitivity – the transfer of features from one 
object to another without any alterations – no longer applicable.
Concerning our research, heterarchy is a  multitude of hierarchies, connected by net-
works and composing aggregations of actors and relations. This structure is heterogeneous, 
which means that actors and relations are exterior to each other. My argument is that heter-
archy is a structure of General Intellect and as such may clarify its composition, its properties 
as general for society and its capacity to have intellect. Without this, General Intellect remains 
no more than a beautiful metaphor. Heterarchy is embedded in theoretical connections be-
tween various kinds of approaches to social multiplicity inspired by G. Deleuze. The main tar-
get of my investigation is a reasoning by A. Negri and other (post)operaists, whose concepts 
will be analysed through the lenses of heterarchy. 
HETERARCHY AND MULTITUDE: CONNECTION STRUCTURE FOR SOCIAL COMPLEXITY
Multitude is the main concept in General Intellect theory – the visible part of social cognition 
representing groups and individuals. The concept was borrowed by A. Negri from A. Mather-
on and means a decentralized organization of relations that represent the association process 
forming social groups from the sets of individuals (Matheron 1988: 370–371; Negri 1991: 109, 
140). Multitude members become singularities, social objects, structurally located between 
particular individuals and the general collectivity of society. Though in later Latin multitudo 
was referred to as a crowd or a mass, Spinoza in his unfinished Political Treaty attributes mul-
titudo to the meaning of society as an association before establishment of a certain political 
order. A swarm of politically acting and negotiating people form conatus, which is reflected 
in their striving for the establishment of political order brought automatically by inertia of 
consent. In contrast to the theory of social contract, an organisational process is guided by 
individual actors’ decisions at a microscale. These decisions automatically establish political 
order by simple aggregation followed by contractual institutions (Matheron 1997: 207–219; 
Balibar 2008: 69–71).
Multitude is a revolutionary force, proposed instead of nation or class as a terrain for 
social cognition and organisation. So, multitude is a form of plural organization, which has 
capacity for political self-organization (Negri 2002). He attacks the  concept of the  people, 
a terrain for sovereignty, and describes multitude as a multiple order and a multiple structure, 
where parts and whole are ontologically equivalent. This kind of organization has no center, 
no exact border (an ontological ‘apartheid’ between more and less real entities) or aim. Negri 
advocates Deleuzian understanding of multiplicity. Ontologically, as pointed out by Deleuze 
and Guattari, parts and whole are the same, since parts may form many different wholes for 
the same relations (Deleuze, Guattari 2003: 2–12).
Negri asserts that multitude is a network of actors, ties, values and other parts. In his opin-
ion, multitude is a rhizome (Negri 2002). Interpreting society as multitude means that there 
are many different social forms united only by their relation to an object. Anyone can be a part 
of multitude and contribute to ‘the primary fount of the valorisation of the world’ by any in-
tellectual activity. Multitude continually strives between activities of singularities – individuals, 
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groups and communities with metastable identifications. The flow of becoming singularities 
makes multitude the  irreversible continuum of relations. Irreversibility of multiple relations 
overcomes any institutional restriction. It equally establishes and destroys any social ties. This 
dynamic social structure is driven by the ‘teleology of common’, where the common is a name 
for intersubjective cooperation. The common does not only unite. It is also the basis for General 
Intellect that comes from living labour in the form of information and knowledge. By sharing 
information, knowledge and activities, multitude may establish a true communistic order via 
ontological features of the social structure.
For Negri, multitude is a  hope for emancipation, but there are two problems arising 
from these speculations. First, how do you turn ontological presence into a political order? In 
other words, irreversibility and plurality of multitude do not aim toward a particular regime. 
If multitude is the multitude, it has to establish all kinds of relations and types of actors that 
simultaneously compete and collaborate with each other (Thacker 2004). Multitude does not 
serve anyone, it does not have an order. Liberation from one order means obedience to anoth-
er one: that is an ontological plurality of society. Therefore, as E. Thacker points out, multitude 
is a network that presupposes diverse topologies of relations that cannot be grouped into one 
hierarchical structure as they are different. It defines itself depending on its topologies (kinds 
of relations, orders, types of actors, etc.) (Thacker 2004).
The second problem focuses on the  commonality of the  ‘common’. Negri writes that 
the common is singular, differently affecting each member of multitude (Negri 2003: 182). 
Ironically, this means that the common does not belong to multitude, so the common simply 
is not common, but exterior, i.e. not only shared but also divided. Commonality of the com-
mon is formal and provides different actors with different fruits of labour. So, it is difficult for 
the common to unify plurality by imposing a teleology of common cooperation. If we wish to 
have a dynamic, singular structure of relations that exists inside a self-organization without 
a command center, then we need to suggest that an order is recursive and comes from the ex-
terior. This literally means that the order comes from other people as individuals and groups 
(singularities) that are plural and cannot be totally subjugated to any kind of a general goal of 
a common cooperation.
Heterarchy, established by the forbiddance of transitivity, may appear as a suitable con-
cept for a structure as a multiple order that avoids a vicious circle of the ‘common’ cooperative 
teleology. Heterarchy holds the whole and its parts as immanent multiple entities that have 
different meanings depending on the environment. It recursively combines different wholes 
that co-exist together. Heterarchy is exterior and temporarily irreversible, since the meaning 
of relationships changes with any deviation from one state to another (Von Goldammer et al. 
2003). Otherness, or exteriority, is extremely important here, as it is not enough to say that het-
erarchy is just a multiple structure. In this case, it could be a polyarchy or a network and would 
not be a subject to a new concept. Heterarchy reflects the fact that relations and their meanings 
are not only multiple but also singular, i.e. finite with series of embodiments. This means that 
the same relation may contain many different meanings for a particular group or an individu-
al. Statistical multitudes emerge on relational activity of individuals organizing the process of 
automatic causation. As they emerge, they are not guided by any kind of teleology (Kerimov 
2019: 18–21). The structural process goes from the outside for any part and whole. Relations 
with various meanings or agencies are tied together without ‘common’ intention.
When individuals and groups become singularities, i.e. relational objects, they cannot 
be any longer identified with a particular attribute, rationality, profession or ethnicity as they 
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begin to carry multiple identifications. Reproducing new attributes brings recursiveness to 
a network of singularities. Overlapping network relations produces recursive hierarchies that 
emerge on multiple associations between singularities. Hierarchy, as well as network, orig-
inates from the  inner multiplicity. Multiple networks accompany hierarchies and recursive 
hierarchies accompany networks. Relations remain multiple by means of networks, but local-
ized by matching hierarchies. As a result, elements in two different hierarchies can interact 
only within the boundaries of the third, partially common or differentiated hierarchy. A net-
work from one hierarchy cannot be moved into the space of another hierarchy or establish 
an equal relationship with it. In a manner of speaking, hierarchies multiply in the process of 
network differentiation. That is why social relations tend to be conservative, whilst elements 
of one hierarchy are passive in their relations with elements found in other hierarchies.
Nevertheless, everyone participates in creation of social praxis as a production of sub-
jectivities and relations, i.e. each singularity participates in the society as a whole, and not 
just inside certain hierarchies (Negri 2002). Networks of singularities, but not hierarchies of 
identities, are a proven tool for the ordered systems multiplication. By a singular nature of 
the social form, activity spreads through mobile networks making subjugation of heterarchy 
(as a social connection structure) to the particular institutional order impossible. Since social 
relations are network-forming hierarchies, heterarchical organization automatically emerges 
depending on singularities activity. Its relational assemblage is metastable, so positions of 
singularities in a connected structure and their activity are mutually dependent. Their con-
nections line up through topological distribution and temporal irreversibility of ties. Time 
is irreversible, but relations can be reversed. Types of relations are finite, but the variety of 
situations is infinite.
SOURCES OF GENERAL INTELLECT
Multitude of hierarchies is united by General Intellect, which is defined as a form of social 
communication that produces subjectivities and knowledge. Then the question is: who pro-
duces General Intellect? As explained earlier, multitude consists of singularities: individu-
als and groups with multiple identifications. They share information, striving for action and 
then collectively revolutionize through statistical aggregation. In addition, General Intellect 
(and that is the  origin of its revolutionary force) produces and shares knowledge exploit-
ed by capitalism. Knowledge requires another mode of organization and another type of an 
actor rather than singularity and aggregate. An agent is another type of an actor that seeks 
goals and produces knowledge, and hierarchy is another mode of organisation. Hierarchy 
emerges through recursiveness of relations in overlapping networks of singularities. Besides 
this, hierarchy appears as a mode for the interior reproduction of singularities. Recursion of 
relations provides opportunity for their temporal and finite manipulation. Hierarchy reduces 
multiplicity to the simulation of unity through coincidence of reasons and goals of relations 
and the point of coincidence is hierarchy itself. Therefore, via delay and operation of time, it 
interiorises the relations and properties of singularities. With the help of hierarchy, singulari-
ties mediate processes, assemble ties and synthesise values (senses), i.e. appear as goal seeking 
agents, which depend on aggregations.
Though individual singularities automatically establish the  multitude as an aggregate 
with the  properties of a  whole, it is rather difficult to impute universal values or volition, 
or any other characteristics of an agent. So, an exteriorly hierarchic aggregate is based on 
statistical repetition and automatic action, and an interiorly hierarchic agent on knowledge 
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and values (meanings, identifications). Different kinds of individual singularities demonstrate 
different levels of agency. Individuals are the main mediums and finite ‘corporeal’ aggregates 
that manifest themselves as agents. The next type is an organisation consisting of persons’ ag-
gregation united by hierarchy of reproducing relations (institutions). Multitude (community) 
is the most general aggregation that possesses properties of agency randomly, since its borders 
are vague and hierarchy is external.
We may see that aggregation and agency supplement each other and the latter repre-
sents development of the former, though remaining exterior. This power of the agent is more 
successful as it is supported by fluctuations of aggregates. The agent and any hierarchical 
institutions are limited by their finite goals and capacity for volition, which at a macro scale 
make them similar to aggregates, actuated by repetition of relations. That is why irreversi-
ble motion of aggregates is able to overcome the power of the agent. The process, in which 
the agent and aggregate correspond to each other, is a ‘living labour’, or ‘the common’ that is 
multiple and in any particular case overcomes exploitation by a particular mode of relations 
(Negri 2003: 225–235).
‘Living labour’ means variable labour, with an absence of strict means for its evaluation. 
If information and knowledge cannot be totally located, they also cannot be manipulated by 
attribution to certain properties. They are displaced, remaining at the same place; one who 
gives it does not lose it. These properties of information and knowledge are long known, but 
our task is to understand relations that produce and organize information and knowledge, as 
the common, into General Intellect as a whole.
Although the common cannot be reified, it is nevertheless structured in some way. Infor-
mation and knowledge have differences as they form different objects. Information as a col-
lection of data is an aggregation, or an aggregative state of knowledge. As such, information 
has no qualitative properties, but only quantitative. Information turns to knowledge when it 
is attributed to the agent, i.e. to the actor with certain goals and actions. Therefore  it depends 
on the actor, will the data be recognized as information or as knowledge. It is no exaggeration 
to say that knowledge defines an actor’s capacity to have a spectrum of goals, consequences of 
actions that make its subjectivation. An actor, the aggregate of properties and qualities, turns 
to an agent with its own set of goals. Of course, we may continue that each agent is a part of 
general aggregations and some of them (as groups, organisations) also possess some proper-
ties of an agent.
 Depending on the  environment and configuration of ties, individual singularity dif-
ferently transforms information to knowledge and differently uses it. Information naturally 
circulates inside of a particular community. Through organisational hierarchy, community 
acquires better cognitive capacities realized in goal setting activities. This contributes to a con-
cealment of information and increase of knowledge. Institutionally reproducing community, 
acting like a kind of agent, as a mediator may exploit ‘structural holes’ (Burt 2004: 349–352) in 
the social whole to extract benefits and power. In its turn, power, especially power of the cap-
ital, excels by governing social ties as aggregates. Here, we have two sides to the operation of 
aggregates. On the one hand, opportunity for their exploitation by the agent means that total 
overcoming of inequality will never come. On the other hand, the  lack of total control by 
the agent means the inevitable overcoming of any totalitarianism, which always remains tem-
porary and partial. This means that ‘making multitude’ as well as its exploitation is an endless 
process, which never ends. General Intellect provides opportunities for both sides of the issue 
and may be used equally for liberation as well as hegemony.
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HETERARCHY AND GENERAL INTELLECT
Let us examine opportunities and limits of General Intellect exploitation using the example of 
the ‘living labour’ management in IT companies and the possible threats to society. Corporate 
sociology (after the followers of A. Gramsci) has already become aware of cognitive organiza-
tion and provided some reasoning on the subject. In his research, D. Stark writes about a new 
kind of managerial organisation in terms that are almost indistinguishable from the concept 
of General Intellect given by P. Virno (Virno, 2001). This new organization represents a form 
of ‘distributed intelligence in which units are laterally accountable according to diverse prin-
ciples of evaluation’ (Stark 2011: 19). According to Stark, this happens in the process of bro-
kerage and entrepreneurship among companies when specific individual and hierarchized 
organizations mediate the work of other actors or include them in their system of relations. 
In other words, one hierarchical organization, which has access to another, can contribute 
to the establishment of a certain joint structure of relations. For Stark, this structure repre-
sents ‘organization of dissonance’ making social complexity work for the different accounts 
of worth. For Virno (and Negri definitely would agree with this) ‘distributed intelligence’ is 
that very General Intellect, associated with emergent variative social structure. Surprisingly, 
the  theory of corporate management, inspired by the example of Silicon (V)Alley with its 
programmers’ informal communication style, came to the  same conclusions as the  Italian 
Operaismo thinkers. What is more surprising, the name for the new kind of structure given 
by Stark was heterarchy.
Put into practice, this method of organization could solve the main problem of social 
theory. More specifically, there is a difference between structure and action, between action 
and cognition. Stark proposes to merge aggregative social complexity and goal setting activity 
of an agent in the organizational structure. However, this technique is really just an exception 
to the rules. In social practice, heterarchy (and its promising economic prospects in the form 
of distributed intelligence) is actually hardly susceptible to formalization. The irreversibility of 
time and topological distribution of processes, leading to complexity of relations, is the main 
impediment. Every hierarchic organization is a kind of agent, limited by its own goals. Linear 
merger usually leads to interruption of their work. Of course, they can establish a mediator, 
but that organization, which is also an agent, will be limited by its own finite goals. If it will 
absorb the previous two organisations and redistribute their tasks and results, we will have 
a hierarchy but not heterarchy. Presence of goals and values points at the limited nature of 
an organisation, which is subordinated to the hierarchical order, whereas heterarchy, being 
multiple, overcomes a particular order as many different orders as aggregations of singular-
ities. Different hierarchies belong to different situations (localities in heterarchical space of 
relations), while their connections establish the third situation, which is not associated with 
the targets of the first two and so on. This way of change is endless and heterogeneous. Total 
subordination of social ties is impossible and that makes total subordination of General Intel-
lect also impossible. This changes the course of singularities’ relations and their choice-mak-
ing. Like heterarchy, General Intellect is experienced as virtual, but is it possible that a virtual 
entity could be exploited by the powers of domination, as well as by those of liberation, con-
cerning some particular issues?
Like heterarchy, General Intellect excels any hierarchical order with imposed goals, be it 
liberation or exploitation. As a connection structure, heterarchy reveals properties that make 
limited opportunities to exploit General Intellect as well as use it to overcome capitalism (or 
any other social order). Due to irreversibility of time and topological configuration of ties, any 
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particular singularity, an aggregate or an agent with its political or economic goals, will always 
depend on its location in the connection structure. All that heterarchy and General Intellect 
can do is to provide opportunities for aggregation of agents. These entities do not serve for 
a particular social order because they produce all the orders simultaneously.
As the brain does not suspect the existence of personality, General Intellect, made by 
social heterarchy, is also not aware of ‘cognitive capitalism’. Owing to the difference of aggre-
gates and agents, General Intellect has no agency, therefore it cannot be subjugated, though it 
is partially possible to operate the capacity of its self-organisation. Even if General Intellect is 
assimilated to assemblage of information machines, as Pasquinelli puts it (Pasquinelli 2009), 
such an exegesis will be insufficient. Information machines are organized around certain 
functions and have no agency, i.e. do not appear as a species that make a decision (transform 
information to knowledge) on their own in the process of the irreversible time. If there is no 
common agency – there is no General Intellect that seeks a particular goal, only self-organi-
sation of singularities’ aggregation.
CONCLUSIONS
The model of heterarchy provides opportunities and imposes limitations on social relations 
and therefore casts light on the extent to which General Intellect can be embodied in the vir-
tual structure of social connections and their specific institutional organizations. If General 
Intellect is something more than a metaphor, then the restriction of transitivity and uncon-
trollable complexity should become its inherent properties.
Society with a heterarchical structure is always the General Intellect since it self-organ-
izes inside the irreversible time through its association of heterogeneous relations. It frames 
the experience and the automaticity of action but denies its reflection as a source of organ-
ization. Some opportunities provided by the  General Intellect can be used, but it cannot 
be forced to conform to a specific institutional order. Control and variation have the same 
source – hierarchies of relations proliferate in a heterarchy while networks remain the tool 
of proliferation. Along with control and application methods, the General Intellect produces 
methods of liberation which come laden with new limitations. By destroying industrial insti-
tutions, network organization has brought new control hierarchies. This process is irreversible 
and is only partially controllable: the processes and composition of topological distribution 
can vary while self-organization of multitude always remains exterior to any social order.
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Straipsnis skirtas bendrinio intelekto problemai, kuri analizuojama postoperaizmo in-
telektualiniame judėjime. Apmąstant A.  Negri, M.  Lazzarato, P.  Virno, M.  Pasquinelli 
ir kitų mintį, bendrinis intelektas čia pateikiamas kaip sinonimas visuomenės pažinti-
nės gebos, kuri gali arba išlaisvinti nuo kapitalizmo, arba būti jo išnaudota. Straipsnyje 
bendrinis intelektas pristatomas kaip socialinio ryšio struktūra, vadinamoji heterarchija. 
Kaip ryšio struktūra, heterarchija suformuoja skirtingų rūšių singuliarumus – baigtinius 
objektus, sudarytus daugybiškų socialinių saitų. Šiuos agregatus sukuria santykių ir in-
dividualių veikėjų, kuriančių vertes nustatant tikslus ir kitą intelektinę veiklą, statistiniai 
pasikartojimai. Pagrindinis šio straipsnio argumentas tas, kad, nors bendrinis intelektas 
gali reikšti visuomenės saviorganizacijos gebą, sunku jį identifikuoti su tik viena kuria 
nors institucine organizacija ar politiniu režimu. Bendrinis intelektas pasirodo bet kurio 
tipo socialiniame struktūravime saviorganizacijos procesais.
Raktažodžiai: bendrinis intelektas, heterarchija, daugybiškumas, visuomenė, saviorga-
nizacija, veikėjas, agregatas
